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Abstract—We study an online reservation system that allows
electric vehicles (EVs) to park and charge at parking facilities
equipped with electric vehicle supply equipment (EVSEs). We
consider the case where EVs arrive in an online fashion and
the facility coordinator must immediately make an admission
or rejection decision as well as assign a specific irrevocable
parking spot to each admitted EV. By means of strategic
user admittance and smart charging, the objective of the
facility coordinator is to maximize total user utility minus the
operational costs of the facilities. We discuss an online pricing
mechanism based on primal-dual methods for combinatorial
auctions that functions as both an admission controller and a
distributor of the facilities’ limited charging resources. We an-
alyze the online pricing mechanism’s performance compared
to the optimal offline solution and provide numerical results
that validate the mechanism’s performance for various test
cases.
NOTATION
N Set of arriving EVs indexed by n
L Set of charging facilities indexed by `
Ml Set of EVSEs at facility ` indexed by m
T Set of time intervals indexed by t = 1, . . . , T
Θ Set of all possible user types
On Set of schedule options that satisfy user n
Ml Number of EVSEs at facility `
Cl Number of cables per EVSE at facility `
El EVSE max energy output at facility `
sl(t) Available solar at facility ` at time t
Sl Max solar generation at facility `
pil(t) Grid energy price per unit at facility ` at time t
Gl(t) Max energy from grid at facility ` at time t
θn Arrival n’s user type
t−n Arrival n’s reservation start time
t+n Arrival n’s reservation end time
hn Arrival n’s energy request
{`n} User n’s preferred facilities
{vn`} User n’s valuations for each facility `
cmlno (t) Cable reservation for user n in option o at
EVSE m at facility ` at time t
emlno (t) Charge reservation for user n in option o at
EVSE m at facility ` at time t
xmlno Binary assignment variable for user n for
option o at EVSE m at facility `
pˆmlno Payment from user n for option o at EVSE m
at facility `
ymlc (t) Cables allocated at EVSE m at facility ` at time t
ymle (t) Energy allocated at EVSE m at facility ` at time t
ylg(t) Total energy needed at facility ` at time t
f lg(·) Facility `’s electricity procurement cost function
un User n’s utility from the EVSE reservation system
pmlc (t) Cable price at EVSE m at facility ` at time t
pmle (t) Charging price at EVSE m at facility ` at time t
plg(t) Energy procurement price at facility ` at time t
f∗(·) Fenchel conjugate of a cost function/constraint
Lc,e,g Lower bound on valuations per resource
Uc,e,g Upper bound on valuations per resource
R Number of resources available across all facilities
α Online mechanism’s competitive ratio
sl(·) Lower bound on available solar energy
sl(·) Upper bound on available solar energy
IC EVSE investment cost per cable
IM EVSE installation cost
Im,n Infrastructure maintenance and networking cost
I. INTRODUCTION
As of October 2018, one million plug-in electric vehicles
(PEVs) have been sold in the United States [1]. Further-
more, sales have exceeded 20,000 units per month since
May 2018 and these numbers are expected to continue
trending upward beyond 2020 [1]. As such, coordinated
charging strategies and charging infrastructure planning are
paramount for ensuring the growing charging demand is
satisfied in an environmentally responsible manner.
There has been a growing number of related papers that
study EV smart charging methods as well as infrastructure
planning and investment analysis to encourage renewable
energy usage in vehicle fleets, aggregate groupings, and
parking facilities. For an overview, [2]–[4] provide in-
depth reviews of smart charging technologies as well as
societal and grid impacts. Investigations on the interactions
between EV aggregations and the grid can be found in
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2[5], [6]. Because smart charging has proven to benefit
society, infrastructure investments must be made to support
future charging implementations [7]–[12]. Papers [9], [11],
[12] study where to locate charging stations as well as
how to effectively size the facilities. In [7], the authors
study a planning framework for charging stations from the
perspective of a social planner. Likewise, the authors in
[8] study the design criteria for Fast Charging Stations
(FCSs) based on mobility behaviors and paper [10] studies
a planning scheme to maximize FCS usage and minimize
infrastructure costs.
A critical but less studied problem is that coordinated
charging at infrastructures can be heavily stunted if usage
of the EVSEs is left uncontrolled [13]. Without EV routing
within parking facilities, EVSEs at preferred locations (e.g.,
near an elevator) can become congested while other EVSEs
are left empty. This limits the smart charging benefits as
congested EVSEs are forced to charge one EV after another
to satisfy charging demand. Similarly, without admission
control the limited charging resources at facilities could
be allocated to low priority users, (e.g., users with small
charging demands, users with long sojourn times, or users
who are willing to park elsewhere) therefore, occluding
high priority users that arrive later in the day. As such,
the focus of this paper is to jointly perform admission
control and smart charging, complementing previous work
on coordinated charging and infrastructure planning.
Prior work in this area includes [14] where the authors
investigate both First-Come-First-Serve (FCFS) and State-
of-Charge (SoC) threshold policies for discerning which
EVs are granted permission to use the EV charging in-
frastructure. Paper [15] studies an online mechanism for
the allocation of electricity to a population of EVs that
have non-increasing marginal value for energy. Their setting
allows for cancellation of reservations, which in our case
is not allowed. In [16], an online algorithm for scheduling
deferrable charging requests to balance the total value of
vehicle owners and the total cost for providing charging
service is studied, but they also allow for revocation of
previously allocated resources. Paper [17] investigates an
online auction that allows EV users to submit bids on
their charging demand to the charging station and then
the mechanism makes corresponding electricity allocation
and pricing decisions. In this approach, users are expected
to update their bids while parked at the charging station
instead of only submitting one initial bid. Additionally, [18]
studied a consensus approach for an online setting where
selfish EVs compete for a limited amount of energy. An
intelligent parking lot energy management system is studied
in [19] to manage the scheduling of EVs to maximize
charging for all EVs. Moreover, paper [20] formulates
and analyzes a market model for deadline-differentiated
pricing of deferrable electric power services; however, it
does not focus on high levels of congestion or adversarial
user valuations. Paper [21] presents a menu-based pricing
scheme for allocating charge time within a facility and
can lead to an efficient alternative approach to the EVSE
reservation problem. The mechanism we present in this
manuscript focuses more on the congestion within facilities
due to limited number of EVSEs and high demand with the
objective of admitting highest priority users. In most previ-
ous work, charging facilities are assumed to have traditional
Single-Output-Single-Cable (SOSC) EVSEs. Recently, a
more versatile charger has been gaining popularity: the
Single-Output-Multiple-Cable (SOMC) EVSE which al-
lows multiple EVs to be connected to the same charger, but
only one EV receives charge at a time [22]. SOMC EVSEs
can improve facility operations by allowing more flexibility
in charge scheduling and decreasing idle plug-in time from
traditional SOSC chargers. Furthermore, SOMC chargers
eliminate the need for users to remove their vehicles once
their charging session is complete. In any SOMC facility
charging strategy, these idle EVs need to be accounted
for; if not, the revenue of the facility will be reduced (our
solution accounts for the times when EVs are charging and
when they are idle). Utilizing SOMC EVSES, the authors
of [22] study infrastructure investments, the authors of [13]
study centralized online assignment methods such as Next-
Fit and Worst-Fit for arriving EVs at a parking facility, and
the authors of [23] study multiple online pricing heuristics
for EV to EVSE allocation to increase smart charging
capabilities.
In this manuscript, we present an online pricing mech-
anism that functions as both an admission controller for
parking facility access and a resource manager that op-
timizes smart charging strategies for vehicles admitted
to the facility. The work presented in this manuscript
complements existing literature in the area and the main
contributions are as follows:
1) The online mechanism readily accommodates multi-
ple locations, multiple limited resources, operational
costs, and renewable generation integration.
2) The online mechanism does not rely on fractional
allocations or rounding methods to produce integer
allocations in a computationally feasible manner and
it never revokes previously made reservations.
3) The online mechanism readily handles the inher-
ent stochasticity of the EVSE reservation problem
including unknown sojourn times, unknown energy
requests, and unknown user valuation functions.
4) The online mechanism is robust to adversarially cho-
sen arrival sequences and always yields social welfare
within a factor of 1α of the offline optimal.
Preliminary results from this paper were previously submit-
ted as a conference paper [24]. In this paper, we present
new theoretical results on the pricing functions by ac-
3counting for time varying behind-the-meter solar generation
and provide more extensive numerical results showing the
performance of the mechanism.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II presents the system model and describes the
offline EVSE reservation problem. Section III presents the
online auction mechanism used to provide an approximate
solution to the EVSE reservation problem and discusses the
online mechanism’s properties and performance guarantees.
Section IV presents simulation results that showcase the
performance of the online mechanism for different test
cases.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
A. System Structure and User Characteristics
In this section, we describe our model for the EVSE
reservation problem and user characteristics. We consider
an EVSE reservation system that controls L dispersed
parking facilities. Each parking facility l ∈ L is equipped
with Ml SOMC EVSEs each with Cl cables (i.e., each
facility can park MlCl EVs at any given time t = 1, . . . , T
but only charge Ml). In addition to the cable constraints,
each EVSE has a maximum power output constraint de-
noted by El that limits the amount of energy the EVSE
can deliver in one time slot. To supply the EVSEs with
electricity, each parking facility can procure energy from
two sources: a rooftop solar generation system or the local
distribution grid. We denote the available solar energy at
facility l at time t with the variable sl(t) ∈ [0, Sl] where
Sl is the maximum rating for facility l’s rooftop system.
Additionally, we denote pil(t) as the per unit price of
electricity from the grid. Due to physical limits of the local
transformer, we constrain facility l to procure no more than
Gl(t) units of energy from the grid at each time slot.
Each day, N EV owners submit requests to park and
charge at various facilities. Each EV owner (user) is char-
acterized by a set of attributes. Suppose user n wants to
park and charge her EV. When she submits her reservation
request at time tn, she commits to arrive at one of her
desired parking facilities {ln} at time t−n and to depart at
t+n . Furthermore, user n receives value {vnl} if her EV
receives hn units of energy from facility l, meaning users
have preferences for different facilities. With the aforemen-
tioned nomenclature, each arrival can be characterized by
user ‘type’:
θn = {t−n , t+n , hn, {ln}, {vnl}} ∈ Θ, (1)
where Θ is the type space of all possible users. Fig. 1
presents an example allocation sequence with 4 arrivals and
2 EVSEs. Specifically, Fig. 1 showcases the fact that there
are limited charging resources within the parking facility
that need to be allocated to the arrivals. Each arriving
EV needs an EVSE cable, an EVSE energy schedule, and
Fig. 1: Example reservation schedule.
the facility needs an energy procurement schedule from i)
behind-the-meter solar, ii) the local distribution grid, or
iii) a combination of solar and grid energy. The arriving
vehicles enter the facility one-by-one and utilize the limited
resources during their stay, affecting how future arrivals are
allocated as seen in Fig. 1.
B. Offline Problem Formulation
To request a reservation, user n submits her user type
θn to the EVSE reservation system. The EVSE reservation
system creates a set of possible schedules that will fulfill
user n’s requirements. Namely, each possible schedule, or
option, contains a cable reservation for the entire parking
duration and the charge schedules that sum up to her desired
charge amount. The reservation system generates these
options for each facility within user n’s desired facility set
and then the option that yields the highest utility to the user
is selected.
We denote the set of options (potential schedules) as On.
Each option o ∈ On corresponds to a facility ln, a cable
reservation cmlno (t), and a charge schedule e
ml
no (t). The cable
reservation cmlno (t) takes values 0 or 1 depending if user n
is assigned a cable from EVSE m at facility l at time t
in option o. Similarly, emlno (t) takes values from a discrete
set corresponding to the energy delivered to user n’s EV.
Through emlno (t), the EVSE reservation system is able to
customize when each EV will receive charge and when it
will be idle as well as the rate of charge. The set of feasible
options for user n can be written as:
{t−n , t+n , {cmlno (t)}, {emlno (t)}, {ln}, {vnl}}. (2)
When deciding whether or not to admit user n and which
option to allocate, the reservation system sets the binary
variable xmlno to 1 if option o is chosen at EVSE m at facility
l. Additionally, the reservation system computes payments
pˆmlno for each option that the user pays if accepted. If a user
is not admitted into any parking facilities, she receives zero
value and parks in an auxiliary lot without EVSEs.
The EVSE reservation system keeps track of the allo-
cated resources throughout the day. The variables ymlc (t)
4and ymle (t) correspond to the allocated cables and energy,
respectively, at EVSE m, facility l, at time t. Each facility
also has to procure the energy needed by all the EVSEs
within; therefore, the total energy needed by facility l at
time t is denoted as ylg(t). Equations (3)-(5) detail how
each resource demand is calculated:
ymlc (t) =
∑
N ,On
cmlno (t)x
ml
no , (3)
ymle (t) =
∑
N ,On
emlno (t)x
ml
no , (4)
ylg(t) =
∑
N ,On,Ml
emlno (t)x
ml
no . (5)
The energy procurement, ylg(t), determines the opera-
tional cost of facility l:
f lg(y
l
g(t)) = (6)
0 ylg(t) ∈ [0, sl(t)
)
pil(t)(y
l
g(t)− sl(t)) ylg(t) ∈ [sl(t), sl(t) +Gl(t)]
+∞ ylg(t) > sl(t) +Gl(t).
The operational cost of the facility is zero while solar
energy is available. Once the demand, ylg(t), exceeds the
available solar, energy is purchased from the grid. Once
the demand exceeds the sum of available behind-the-meter
solar energy and the transformer limit, no more energy can
be procured.
With the system variables and equations defined, we
can write the offline social welfare maximization problem
(assuming all users’ information is known beforehand):
max
x
∑
N ,On,L,Ml
vnlx
ml
no −
∑
T ,L
f lg(y
l
g(t)) (7a)
subject to:∑
On,L,Ml
xmlno ≤ 1, ∀ n (7b)
xmlno ∈ {0, 1}, ∀ n, o, l,m (7c)
ymlc (t) ≤ Cl, ∀ l,m, t (7d)
ymle (t) ≤ El, ∀ l,m, t (7e)
and (3), (4), (5).
Moreover, the objective (7a) is to maximize the total social
welfare of the system. This includes the utility gained by
arrivals using the system minus the operational costs of the
facilities (we note that users who are not admitted receive
utility equal to zero). Constraints (7b)-(7e) respectively en-
sure at most one option is selected per user, the assignment
variable is an integer, the cable demand does not exceed
capacity, and the energy demand does not exceed capacity.
Equations (3)-(5) sum the resource demands.
Temporarily relaxing the integrality constraint (7c) on
xmlno allows us to find the Fenchel dual problem with
dual variables un, pmlc (t), p
ml
e (t), and p
l
g(t) [25]. In the
following, the Fenchel conjugate of a function is given as:
f∗(p(t)) = sup
y(t)≥0
{
p(t)y(t)− f(y(t))}. (8)
Accordingly, the Fenchel dual of (7a)-(7e) can be written:
min
u,p
∑
N
un +
∑
T ,L
f l∗g (p
l
g(t)) (9a)
+
∑
T ,L,Ml
(
fml∗c (p
ml
c (t)) + f
ml∗
e (p
ml
e (t))
)
subject to:
un ≥ vnl −
∑
T
(
cmlno (t)p
ml
c (t) (9b)
+ emlno (t)
(
pmle (t) + p
l
g(t)
)) ∀ n, o, l,m
un ≥ 0, ∀ n (9c)
pmlc (t), p
ml
e (t), p
l
g(t) ≥ 0, ∀ l,m, t, (9d)
where f∗(p(t)) is the Fenchel conjugate for the limited
resources’ dual variables. The Fenchel conjugates for the
capacity constraints can be written as:
fml∗c (p
ml
c (t)) = p
ml
c (t)Cl, p
ml
c (t) ≥ 0 (10)
fml∗e (p
ml
e (t)) = p
ml
e (t)El, p
ml
e (t) ≥ 0. (11)
Additionally, the Fenchel conjugate for the energy procure-
ment operational cost function can be written as:
f l∗g (p
l
g(t)) = (12){
sl(t)p
l
g(t), p
l
g(t) < pil(t)
(sl(t) +Gl(t))p
l
g(t)−Gl(t)pil(t) plg(t) ≥ pil(t).
C. Admittance, Rejection, and Allocation Decisions
To determine how the EVSE reservation system decides
whether or not to admit a user as well as which option
to select if admitted, we make use of the Fenchel dual
(9a)-(9d). Specifically, we examine the KKT conditions for
constraint (9b). If a user is denied in the offline problem,
un will be 0; otherwise, if a user is admitted, un will be
positive. As such, the EVSE reservation system solves the
following equation to determine user n’s acceptance and
her resource allocation:
un = max
{
0, max
On,L,Ml
{
vnl (13)
−
∑
t∈[t−n ,t+n ]
(
cmlno (t)p
ml
c (t) + e
ml
no (t)(p
ml
e (t) + p
l
g(t))
)}}
.
We note that un corresponds to user n’s utility from the
EVSE reservation system. If admitted, the cable reservation
and charge schedule chosen for user n correspond to the
option o, EVSE m, and facility l that maximize the second
term in equation (13). Furthermore, the dual variables
pmlc (t), p
ml
e (t), and p
l
g(t) correspond to prices that users
must pay for cables, energy, and energy procurement. As
5such, the total payments corresponding to user n’s different
options are calculated as:
pˆmlno =
∑
T
(
cmlno (t)p
ml
c (t) + e
ml
no (t)(p
ml
e (t) + p
l
g(t))
)
.
(14)
The EVSE reservation system is allocating options that
maximize each user’s utility with respect to the current
marginal prices. Additionally, users receive non-negative
utility for participating in the EVSE reservation system;
therefore, we satisfy individual rationality constraints.
We would like to note that our proposed mechanism can
also be used without any actual payments if users do not
have the option of choosing their type (i.e., their types are
preassigned). In a company, if users are assigned valuations
(e.g., CEO has a high value and regular employee has lower
value, or someone with high charge level has lower value),
then the prices do not have to be economic incentives.
Rather they are used as dual variables that guide each
users allocation without any monetary transfer (i.e., each
employee does not actually have to pay to use the infras-
tructure, but different employees have different valuations
and the “shadow prices” allow for quick allocations).
The optimization problems presented in (7a)-(7e) and
(9a)-(9d) assume complete knowledge of the arrivals be-
forehand. In practice, this is not the case; rather, users arrive
and depart throughout the day. As such, the solution needs
to be an online mechanism that can immediately allocate
an arrival without knowledge of the future sequence of
arrivals. Additionally, once a user has parked her car within
a charging facility, she should not be asked to prematurely
move her EV before her departure time. As such, the online
mechanism should never revoke previous allocations. In
the following, we discuss an online allocation mechanism
that solves the EVSE reservation problem and meets the
aforementioned design goals.
III. ONLINE ALLOCATION MECHANISM
A. Online Marginal Prices
It is evident that the EVSE reservation problem requires
an online solution. In many online problems, approximate
dynamic programming (ADP) heuristics have good perfor-
mance given accurate statistics even with large state-spaces
[26]–[29]. However, performance guarantees can be very
hard to obtain for multi-stage decision making problems
with complex action spaces over long time periods, and
in our case, nonstationary arrival patterns and variable
forecasts prohibit many traditional ADP techniques. As
such, we present an online pricing mechanism that cal-
culates the marginal prices on EVSE cables, energy, and
generation based on a pricing heuristic, for which we
provide performance guarantees. Specifically, our EVSE
reservation system updates the prices p(t) heuristically as
the amounts of allocated resources y(t) evolve, but only
based on past observations. The pricing scheme has two
major goals: (1) to make sure that the marginal gain in
welfare from an allocation is greater than the operational
cost incurred to serve the allocation, and (2) to filter out low
value users early to ensure there are adequate resources for
higher value users later on. The structure of the marginal
price functions we use is similar to that of [30], where the
authors present a pricing framework for cloud-computing
systems utilizing data centers with limited computation
resources and server costs under an adversarial setting. For
the limited number of cables at each EVSE, the proposed
marginal payment function is given by:
pmlc (y
ml
c (t)) =
( Lc
2
∑
LMl(Cl + El +
1
Ml
)
)
(15)
×
(2∑LMl(Cl + El + 1Ml )Uc
Lc
) ymlc (t)
Cl ,
where ymlc (t) is the current demand for the cables at EVSE
m at location l at time t. Additionally, Lc and Uc are the
lower and upper bounds on users’ valuation per cable per
unit of time, respectively:
Lc = minN ,On,L,Ml
vnl∑
LMl(Cl + El +
1
Ml
)
∑
t∈[t−n ,t+n ] c
ml
no (t)
,
(16a)
Uc = maxN ,On,L,Ml,T
vnl
cmlno (t)
, cmlno (t) 6= 0. (16b)
The pricing function for the EVSE energy units is the same
as (15) with the exponent changed to El instead of Cl.
Likewise, calculate Le and Ue using enlno(t) in (16a) and
(16b). Additionally, for the energy procurement resource,
Lg and Ug are the same as Le and Ue, respectively.
To explain this pricing function, set ymlc (t) = 0 and (15)
outputs a price low enough that any user will be accepted
(subject to Lc). Moreover, the pricing function (15) yields
low initial values to allow reservations early on. As more
arrivals are admitted into the reservation system, congestion
begins to affect the shared resources. To combat congestion
and filter our low value arrivals, as ymlc (t) increases, the
prices from (15) increase exponentially. When ymlc (t) is
equal to the capacity of the limited resource, the marginal
price is set high enough to reject all future arrivals to ensure
that no resource will ever be overallocated (we assume Lc
and Uc are known).
Designing a pricing function for energy procurement at
each facility is more complicated than the cable pricing.
Here, the cost to procure energy is piecewise linear and
depends on the current solar generation and the transformer
6capacity. As such, we propose the pricing function:
plg(y
l
g(t)) = (17)
(
Lg
2R
)(
2Rpil(t)
Lg
) ylg(t)
sl(t) , ylg(t) < sl(t),(
Lg−pil(t)
2R
)(
2R(Ug−pil(t))
Lg−pil(t)
) ylg(t)
sl(t)+Gl(t) + pil(t),
ylg(t) ≥ sl(t),
where R =
∑
L
Ml(Cl + El +
1
Ml
).
Equation (17) is similar to the pricing function for the
EVSE cables and energy; however, because procuring en-
ergy from the grid has non-zero cost, we need to ensure
each user’s payment is greater than the electricity cost
needed to charge their vehicle. Additionally, when a fa-
cility’s energy demand is less than the available solar, the
marginal energy procurement price is reduced below the
cost of electricity pil(t) to promote solar consumption.
Fig. 2: Pricing function for energy procurement. Shaded
area: increase in users’ utilities from updated pricing func-
tion.
B. Proposed Algorithm and Performance Guarantees
The admittance, allocation, and price update procedure
for the EVSE reservation system is presented in Algorithm
ONLINEPARKNCHARGE. When arrival n submits her re-
quest, the system generates the feasible options On that
fulfill her demands. Then, the system accepts or rejects user
n depending on her potential utility gain due to her valua-
tion and the current resource prices (line 7). We note that
line 9 requires solving an integer constrained maximization
problem. This is not computationally burdensome as the
optimization is solved for each individual vehicle at the
time of arrival, with the potential utilities for each option
can be calculated quickly via multiplication and addition.
Then, any sorting method can be used to find the highest
utility option. The algorithm updates the primal variables
xmlno after each acceptance and rejection. The total resource
demands are updated in line 12 if user n is accepted into the
system. Similarly, the marginal resource prices are updated
accordingly in line 13.
Algorithm 1 ONLINEPARKNCHARGE
Input: L,Ml, Cl, El, Gl, Sl, pil, Lc,e,g, Uc,e,g
Output: x, p
1: Define f lg(ylg(t)) according to (6).
2: Define the pricing functions p(y(t)) according to (15) and
(17) for cables, energy, and generation.
3: Initialize xmlno = 0, yml(t) = 0, un = 0.
4: Initialize prices p(0) according to (15) and (17).
5: Repeat for all N users:
6: User n submits θn, generate feasible charging options.
7: Update dual variable un according to (13).
8: if un > 0 then
9: (o?,m?, l?) = argmaxL,Ml,On
{
vnl
−∑
t∈[t−n ,t+n ]
(
cmlno (t)p
ml
c (t)
+emlno (t)(p
ml
e (t) + p
l
g(t))
)}
10: pˆm
?l?
no? =
∑
t∈[t−n ,t+n ]
(
cm
?l?
no? (t)p
m?l?
c (t)
+em
?l?
no? (t)(p
m?l?
e (t) + p
l?
g (t))
)
11: xm
?l?
no? = 1 and x
ml
no = 0 for all (o, l,m) 6= (o?, l?,m?)
12: Update total demand y(t) for cables, energy, and genera-
tion according to (3)-(5).
13: Update marginal prices p(t) for cables, energy, and gener-
ation according to (15) and (17).
14: else
15: xmlno = 0, ∀ L, Ml and On.
16: end if
17: if ∃o?,m?, l? and xm?l?no? = 1 then
18: Accept user n and allocate cables and energy in parking
location l? at EVSE m?.
19: Charge user n at pˆm
?l?
no? .
20: else
21: Send user n to auxiliary parking.
22: end if
Next, we compare the total social welfare resulting from
the online solution to the optimal offline solution. Specif-
ically, an online mechanism is said to be α-competitive
when the ratio of social welfare from the optimal offline so-
lution to the social welfare from the mechanism is bounded
by α ≥ 1. We extend a competitive ratio performance
guarantee from [30] in Proposition 1. In the following, to
ensure no user purchases too large of a fraction of the
total available resource, we assume each user’s resource
demands are much smaller than the capacity limits.
Proposition 1. The marginal pricing function (17) is α1-
competitive in social welfare when selling limited resources
with the piecewise linear operational cost in (6) where
α1 = 2 maxL,T
{
ln
(2∑LMl(Cl + El + 1Ml )(Ug − pil(t))
Lg − pil(t)
)}
with the assumption
∑
LMl(Cl + El +
1
Ml
) ≥
d eLg2maxL,T pil(t)e.
Proof. For α-competitiveness, the authors of [30] show that
marginal pricing functions, operational cost functions, and
7Fenchel conjugates for the limited resources need to satisfy
the Differential Allocation-Payment Relationship given by:(
plg(t)− f l
′
g (y
l
g(t))
)
dylg(t) ≥
1
αlg(t)
f l∗
′
g (p
l
g(t))dp
l
g(t)
(18)
for all l ∈ L, t = 1, . . . , T . For the energy-procurement
operational cost in (6) and its Fenchel conjugate (12)
respectively, the following derivatives are:
f l
′
g (y
l
g(t)) =
{
0, ylg(t) ∈ [0, sl(t))
pil(t), y
l
g(t) ∈ [sl(t), sl(t) +Gl(t)]
(19)
and
f l∗
′
g (p
l
g(t)) =
{
sl(t), p
l
g(t) ∈ [0, pil(t))
sl(t) +Gl(t), p
l
g(t) ≥ pil(t).
(20)
The derivative of the proposed pricing function (17) is:
dplg(y
l
g(t)) = (21)
(
Lg
2Rsl(t)
)(
2Rpil(t)
Lg
) ylg(t)
sl(t)
× ln
(
2Rpil(t)
Lg
)
dylg(t), y
l
g(t) < sl(t),(
Lg−pil(t)
2R(sl(t)+Gl(t))
)(
2R(Ug−pil(t))
Lg−pil(t)
) ylg(t)
sl(t)+Gl(t)
× ln
(
2R(Ug−pil(t))
Lg−pil(t)
)
dylg(t), y
l
g(t) ≥ sl(t),
where R =
∑
L
Ml(Cl + El +
1
Ml
).
When ylg(t) < sl(t), f
l′
g (y
l
g(t)) = 0 and f
l∗′
g (p
l
g(t)) =
sl(t). As such, after inserting the derivative (21) in (18),
we can show that the Differential Allocation-Payment
Relationship holds when αˆlg(t) ≥ ln
(
2Rpil(t)
Lg
)
as long
as R ≥ d eLg2maxL,T pil(t)e. The constraint on R ensures
αˆlg(t) ≥ 1.
Similarly, when ylg(t) ≥ sl(t), f l
′
g (y
l
g(t)) = pil(t) and
f l∗
′
g (p
l
g(t)) = sl(t) + Gl(t). As such, after inserting the
derivative (21) in (18), we can show that the Differen-
tial Allocation-Payment Relationship holds when ˆˆαlg(t) ≥
ln
(
2R(Ug−pil(t))
Lg−pil(t)
)
. Now, let αlg(t) = max{αˆlg(t), ˆˆαlg(t)}
and because (18) holds for the proposed pricing function,
operational cost function, and Fenchel conjugate, the re-
mainder of the proof follows from Lemma 1 and Theorem
2 in [30].
Corollary 1.1. If the final demand for energy procurement
ylg(t) for a given day is less than the available solar sl(t),
the marginal pricing function (17) is α2-competitive (α2 <
α1) in social welfare when selling limited resources with
the piecewise linear operational cost in (6) where
α2 = 2 maxL,T
{
ln
(2∑LMl(Cl + El + 1Ml )(pil(t))
Lg
)}
.
In the previous proposition, the pricing function (17)
relies on complete knowledge of the solar generation sl(t).
If the system has inaccurate solar irradiation forecasts, the
solar generation could be overestimated and resources are
over-allocated resulting in infeasible solutions, which our
online solution should avoid at all costs; or solar generation
is underestimated and prices are set too high and the
system rejects users that should otherwise be accepted.
We analyze the case where we have a forecast of the
solar generation each day in terms of a confidence interval.
We do not assume a specific solar irradiance forecasting
method; rather, we make use of a confidence interval for
the potential solar each day as yearly solar irradiance
recordings can provide minimum and maximum bounds for
any given day. Additionally, out method assumes that these
confidence regions are tightening as the day progresses.
In this paper, we assume that the solar forecast for a
future time t increases in accuracy as the current time
tcurrent approaches t. Specifically, the solar forecast takes
the following form:
sl(t) ∈ [sl(t, tcurrent), sl(t, tcurrent)], (22)
for t = 1, . . . , T and 1 ≤ tcurrent ≤ t. Here, sl(t) is the
actual solar generation at time t and the terms sl(t, tcurrent)
and sl(t, tcurrent) are lower and upper bounds given by the
forecast, respectively, at an earlier time tcurrent. We assume
that the forecast is improving, specifically sl(t, tcurrent)
is non-increasing and sl(t, tcurrent) is non-decreasing as
tcurrent approaches t.
To account for the dependence of the solar forecast
on the current time, the marginal pricing function (17)
is now written as plg(y
l
g(t), tcurrent). To avoid possible
infeasible allocations associated with overestimation of
solar availability, we analyze the performance of pricing
function (17) that conservatively uses the underestimate of
the solar generation, sl(t, tcurrent), in Proposition 2. Fig.
3 shows how the pricing function (17) changes as the solar
forecast improves.
Fig. 3: Pricing function with solar forecast sl(t, tcurrent).
Proposition 2. The marginal pricing function (17) with
an underestimate of solar generation, sl(t, tcurrent), is
8α3 = 2 maxL,T
{
αlg(t)
}
competitive in social welfare
when selling limited resources with the operational cost
in (6) where
αlg(t) = (23)
max
{
sl(t,1)
sl(t,1)
ln( 2Rpil(t)Lg ),
sl(t,1)+Gl(t)
sl(t,1)+Gl(t)
ln(
2R(Ug−pil(t))
Lg−pil(t) )
}
,
sl(t, 1) 6= 0,
sl(t,1)+Gl(t)
Gl(t)
ln(
2R(Ug−pil(t))
Lg−pil(t) ), sl(t, 1) = 0,
with the assumption R ≥ d eLg2maxL,T pil(t)e.
Proof. The proof is omitted for brevity. The proof follows
the same structure as Proposition 1 using the lower bound
solar generation estimates instead of the actual solar gen-
eration amounts as well as the non-increasing and non-
decreasing properties of the upper and lower estimates,
respectively.
We would like to note the significance of Proposition 1
and Proposition 2 in the following. Namely, our competitive
ratio results ensure the social welfare generated by the
approximate online solution (that runs in real-time) cannot
deviate too far from the social welfare generated by the
oracle offline solution. The results in Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2 ensure the online system, which acts without
knowledge of future arrivals, performs within a constant
factor of the offline/oracle system. Furthermore, the com-
petitive ratios are worst case bounds on performance. That
is, if this pricing scheme is used in a real scenario, even
the social welfare generated with respect to an adversarially
chosen arrival sequence is within the constant α of the
optimal oracle solution.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
A. The Case of Variable Arrival Patterns
In this section, we present a comparison of our online
pricing mechanism against an online certainty equivalent
controller (CEC) for a downtown parking facility to show
the performance our mechanism under different arrival
statistics. CEC is an approximate dynamic programming
(ADP) technique that replaces all future uncertain quantities
with some typical values, more specifically, the expected
values. In this case, we assume that the facility has arrival
patterns following the distributions in Figure 4. In this
example, there is 1 parking facility with 5 EVSEs and 4
cables per EVSE (i.e., there are 20 parking slots available
in each time period). The facility can purchase energy from
the Los Angeles grid at a cost of $0.127/kWh. Lastly,
the facility has a 32 kW rooftop solar generation system
that follows a production curve from an LA location in
January 2018 [31]. We assume standard crystalline silicon
panels with 14% system loss due to shading, wiring,
connections, mismatch, and degradation. We simulated the
CEC and pricing mechanism for 2 different arrival count
Fig. 4: Top Left: Energy requests. Top Right: User valua-
tions. Bottom Left: Arrival times (blue) and departure times
(red). Bottom Right: Length of stay.
distributions (as shown in Fig. 5). To demonstrate the value
of adverserial solutions like ours in situations when the
future is hard to predict, the distribution exhibits a larger
variance under the second scenario.
Fig. 5: Top: Social welfare for facility with unimodal arrival
count distribution. Bottom: Social welfare for facility with
bimodal arrival count distribution.
From our results in Figure 5, it is evident that in the case
of higher variance arrival patterns, our pricing mechanism
outperforms a controller that is dependant on expected
statistics. If a parking facility does not have consistent
arrival statistics each day, our pricing mechanism performs
better because it accounts for worst-case arrival patterns.
Additionally, in the unimodal and bimodal arrival count
cases, the minimum daily social welfare of our mechanism
is larger than that of the CEC ADP.
9Fig. 6: Top Left: FCFS’s total user utility vs. number of
daily arrivals (50 scenarios simulated). Top Right: Our
online heuristic’s total user utility vs. number of daily
arrivals (50 scenarios simulated). Bottom Left: FCFS’s
number of admitted EVs vs. demand level (identical result
for all 50 scenarios). Bottom Right: Our online heuristic’s
number of admitted EVs vs. demand level (50 scenarios
simulated).
B. Comparison with First-Come-First-Serve Strategy
In this section, we present a comparison of our online
pricing mechanism against the first-come-first-serve (FCFS)
strategy that is commonplace in many EVSE equipped
charging facilities. Specifically, we highlight the perfor-
mance of our mechanism over varying demand levels
to show the effectiveness of our mechanism when the
infrastructure becomes congested. In the FCFS strategy,
an arriving EV selects the closest available parking spot
and begins charging immediately (without any controller
directing them). In this test case, we assume the arrivals’
energy requests, valuations, and durations follow the same
statistics as in Fig. 4; however, in this simulation, we di-
rectly control the number of arrivals each day (to highlight
different demand levels) and we limit the arrival times
to 8:00am-10:00am and limit the departure times to after
10:00am (thus showcasing the performance of FCFS and
our mechanism when large quantities of vehicles arrive in
a short time period each morning). We assume the parking
infrastructure has 15 EVSEs with 4 cables each, yielding
60 parking spots total.
We compare the total user utility yielded from the FCFS
strategy to our online heuristic with demand increasing
from 1 to 120 arrivals each day. As shown in Fig. 6, the
total user utility increases steadily as the number of EVs
entering the system increases. However, when the demand
for the EVSEs is high, our online mechanism is able to
filter out low value arrivals to admit higher value arrivals
instead, and yield higher total utility. It is worth noting that
Fig. 7: Comparison of behind-the-meter solar energy usage
for a day with 100 arrivals.
the FCFS strategy yields similar total utility if the demand
for charging is low; this is because FCFS admits all arrivals
as long as there are open parking spots.
Additionally, in Fig. 7, we show the fraction of behind-
the-meter solar used by our mechanism and FCFS for a day
when there are 100 arriving EVs. From the plot, it is evident
that our online mechanism is able to utilize significantly
more solar energy, thus eliminating the need to send large
amounts of excess energy back to the distribution grid.
Specifically, our mechanism is able to schedule charging to
time slots when there is available solar, while FCFS is not
able to schedule charging times. The results in this section
show that our mechanism outperforms the commonplace
FCFS strategy in congested facilities in addition to better
utilizing behind-the-meter solar.
C. Multi-Facility Test Case
In this section, we present a multi-facility example lo-
cated in downtown Los Angeles. Specifically, we look at 6
parking facilities with varying rooftop generation amounts.
We assume standard crystalline silicon panels with 14%
system loss. Facility 6 has a 75kW solar generation sys-
tem, facility 5 has 60kW, facility 4 has 45kW, facility 3
has 30kW, facility 2 has 15kW, and facility 1 does not
have any solar generation. We examined a 20 day period
with 600 arrivals each day. Each arrival has valuation in
[$1, $10], energy request in [1, 20] kWh, and stay length
in [1, 8] hours. Each of the 6 facilities has 8 SOMC
EVSEs each equipped with 4 cables. Furthermore, each
facility purchases electricity from the Los Angeles grid at
$0.127/kWh. We examine the performance of the system
with transformer capacity limits of 75kVA.
Figure 8 shows the total user utility, social welfare,
and electricity cost for 20 days. An observation worth
noting is the total user utility from our updated pricing
function is always larger than that of a solar agnostic
pricing framework. This is due to setting lower prices on the
electricity generation resource when there is solar available
as seen in Figure 2 (our previous work was agnostic to the
free solar generation). Moreover, over the 20 day period,
our updated pricing mechanism admits 387 arrivals on
average while our previous work only admits 369 arrivals
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on average. As such, our updated mechanism is favorable
for users of the system as prices are lower and more users
are admitted. Additionally, our improved mechanism is able
to utilize more solar, reducing reliance on the local grid.
Fig. 8: Multi-facility example. Red: solar aware pricing.
Blue: solar agnostic pricing.
D. Importance of Accurate Departure Times
In this section, we discuss the effect of inaccurate depar-
ture time reporting. For example, consider the case when
a user reports that she will exit the system by 4:00pm;
however, she gets delayed and cannot remove her EV
until 5:00pm or later. This affects the reservation system
because there might be a reservation for the EVSE at
that timeslot. To avoid these reservation collisions due to
delayed departures, we analyze the performance of the
system with extra hours added to each arrival’s stay length
as a “buffer” to prevent double-allocations. We examined
the same test case as Section IV-C with buffer sizes of 1
and 2 hours added to each arrival’s stay length. Adding 1
and 2 hour departure buffers yielded average social welfare
losses of 16% and 29%, respectively.
E. Infrastructure Recommendation
In this section, we demonstrate the importance of infras-
tructure planning in order to maximize the smart charging
capabilities of a parking facility. A facility with too few
EVSEs will limit the users’ utilities as well as the smart
charging potential. Conversely, installing too many EVSEs
results in idle chargers. As such, we perform a cost-benefit
analysis to determine the number of cables at each SOMC
EVSE as well as the number of EVSEs that should be
installed at a facility in order to maximize social welfare
over an extended period. Specifically, we are simulating
the same system as described in Sections IV-C and IV-D;
however, we have increased the duration to 2 years (730
days). Furthermore, we are including initial and recurring
Fig. 9: Cost-benefit analysis over 2 years.
costs relating to a parking structure equipped with SOMC
EVSEs. These costs include EVSE unit costs, installation
costs, electricity consumption, maintenance, and network-
ing costs. In the following, we are looking to choose
the constraint variables Cl and Ml (number of cables per
EVSE and number of EVSEs, respectively) that maximize
users’ utilities minus the aforementioned investment and
operational costs. We use IC to denote the EVSE unit
investment per cable and IM to denote the installation cost
per SOMC EVSE. Additionally, Im,n represents a recurring
infrastructure maintenance and networking cost per EVSE.
As such, the infrastructure investment cost can be written
as: ∑
L
(
ICCl + IM
)
Ml + T
∑
L
Im,nMl. (24)
In (24), the first term is the initial investment cost for the
SOMC EVSE hardware and installation and the second
term represents the recurring maintenance and networking
cost. In the following, we assumed each EVSE was a
pedestal mounted unit with an installation cost of $3, 308
[32]. Additionally, each extra cable for each SOMC in-
creased the cost of the EVSE by $3, 343 [32]. Last, the
recurring networking and maintenance fee was assumed to
be $75 per month [32]. Figure 9 shows the comparison of
total social welfare generated across the entire time period
for various levels of infrastructure investments. For this
test case, the best result occurred when each location had
7 SOMC EVSEs each equipped with 6 cables. With this
level of infrastructure, the system did not yield positive
social welfare until the second year of operation. As seen
in Fig. 9, it is clear that sizing a facility for the given
use case is critical. Smart charging strategies require a
sufficient number of EVSEs to yield maximal benefits;
however, welfare decreases if extra EVSEs are purchased
and underutilized.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we presented an online pricing mechanism
as a solution to the EVSE reservation problem. The online
mechanism functions as both an admission controller and a
distributor of the facilities’ limited charging resources. The
work presented in this manuscript complements existing
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literature in the area and the important characteristics are
as follows. First, the mechanism readily accommodates
multiple locations, multiple limited resources, operational
costs, and variable arrival patterns. The mechanism does
not rely on fractional allocations or rounding methods to
produce integer allocations in a computationally feasible
manner and it never revokes previously made reservations.
Moreover, our online mechanism readily handles the inher-
ent stochasticity of the EVSE reservation problem including
unknown sojourn times, unknown energy requests, and
unknown user valuation functions. The online mechanism
can handle adversarially chosen arrival sequences and still
generate social welfare within a factor of 1α of the offline
optimal. We discussed a competitive ratio as a performance
guarantee for the online mechanism compared to the oracle
offline solution and provided numerical results showing the
efficacy of the mechanism.
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